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l v SUMMARY: This petn presents the issue left open 
in £ gersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972): is an indigent 
defendant entitled to the assistance of counsel in a criminal 
prosecution which, under the criminal statute, might result in 
~ctual imprisonment? Because Argersinger precludes imprisonment 
when counsel was not provided, it may be more accurate to cast 
the question in slightly different terms: does the right to 
Yf ~ 14(7 ,,,,,,.C/d, /1,N.t); f'°'~ (.:~.:tt, G/2AIJT. 
~ 
the assistance of counsel extend to prosecutions for crimes 
sufficiently serious that the legislature has made imprisonment 
a possible sentence? 
~
2. FACTS: Petr was collared by a store security guard for 
shop-lifting. At the trial before a Chicago circuit court, 
the prosecutor presented only one witness, the guard, who 
testified that he stopped petr outside the store. Petr, to 
whom nothing had been said regarding the assistance of counsel, 
then told his story, which was that he was stopped while still 
inside the store and at a time when, with money in hand, he 
was looking for a sales person. The judge then stated to the 
prosecutor, "There's a lot of questions I want to know." The 
prose cu tor responded, "Ask them. " The Court: "Why don't you ask . 
them? Are you going to leave it right there?" The prosecutor: 
"We feel we have made our case." The judge thereupon asked 
petr a series of questions regarding the incident in order 
to clarify pe t r's story. The judge then stated to petr, 
"I don't believe you, sir. Finding of guilt." Petr was sen-
tenced to pay a $50 fine. -- .... v-
The Appellate Court rejected petr's right to counsel argument, 
which was made there on both federal constitutional and state 
statutory grounds. In doing so, it proceeded on the assumption 
that petr was indigent in fact at the time of the trial. Although 
the record did not show that defendant petitioned for an appointed 
trial counsel on the grounds of indigency, the State agreed 
with petr that he was an indigent person in the trial court and 
,that he had not been advised of a right to the assistance of trial 
counsel. Further, he had established his right to 
-3-
appointed appellate counsel because of indigency. 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating its disinclination 
to extend Argersinger ''merely because a defendant is charged with 
a statutory offense which provides for various sentencing alter-
natives upon conviction [including imprisonment]." Petn, at 3a. 
Like the Appellate Court, it assumed that petr was indigent at 
the time of his trial. 
Justice Goldenhersh dissented, arguing that the right to 
the assistance of couns el is so important that "judges should 
not engage in nice calculations about when that right should be 
enjoyed." Petn, at Sa. He also contended that judges do 
not have, prior to the trial, the kind of in f ormation necessary 
to an intelligent decision regarding sentencing, a decision 
required by the narrow reading of Argersinger. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr relies heavily on Mr. Justice 
~ well's concurrence in Arge rsinger that "It would be illogical 
and without discernible support in the Constitution -- to hold 
that no discretion may ever be exerci s ed where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse the 
legitimacy of discretion in 'non-jail' petty-offense cases 
which may result in far more serious consequences than a few 
hours or days of incarceration." 407 U.S., at 25. Petr also 
restates many of the arguments leveled by Mr. Justice Powell 
and others at the imprisonment-in-fact standard: the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects both property and liberty; non-jail penalties 
'can be more serious, both directly and in their collateral con-
sequences, than jail sentences; the judge must determine 
without adequate information whether to impose a term of 
imprisonment before hearing the case, which frustrates legis-
lative purposes, leads to arbitrary decisions, and denies 
defendants of equal protection. Petr also argues that he 
was deprived of a fair trial here because of the lack of 
legal assistance. 
Petr also contends that there is a circuit split and a 
division among the state courts on the question presented here. 
He also notes the existence of a split on closely related 
questions: can counselless misdemeanor convictions be used 
either for impeachment purposes in subsequent trials of the 
defendant or for enhancing the defendant's sentence for sub-
sequent convictions. 
4. DISCUSSION: Most state and federal courts have not 
extended Argersinger to those instances where imprisonment 
does not in fact result. ~,United States v. White, 529 
F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976). Petr cites a plethora of cases supposedly 
coming down the other way but all but two of them are opinions 
where the holding in Argersinger is casually misstated, or, more 
accuaretly, not stated with sufficient precision, and the 
misstatement is in no way material to the conclusion of the 
court. V'Two courts, however, CA 5 and the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, have consciously examined the issue presented here 
and ruled that the possibility of imprisonment triggers a right 
to the assistance of counsel. Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th 
Cir. 1976), cert denied, December 12, 1977 (No. 77-503); Thomas 
v. Savage, 513 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1975); State ex rel. Winnie v. 
Harris, 249 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1977). CA 5 merely continued its 
pre-Argersinge r position. The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied 
primarily on the argume nt that the trial judge, whether proce eding 
on an ad hoc basis or the basis of categories of crimes, cannot 
sensibly make the imprisonment decision before the case has been 
tried, as the narrow reading of Argersinge r requires. It thus -
agreed with the conclusions in S. Krantz, et al, Right to Coun s el 
in Criminal Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger v. Hamlin 69-117 
(1976). 
In Decembe r 1977, the Court denied cert in Potts, supra, where 
the admissibility of prior counselless misdemeanor convictions 
for impeachment purposes was raised. In ~ dasa r v. Illinois, 
April 14, 1978 Conference, List 2, Sheet 2 (No. 77-6219) (no 
respons e ), p e tr asks whether a prior uncounseled mi s demeanor 
conviction ma y be used to increase a sentence for a subsequent 
misdemeanor offense under an enhanced penalty statute. 
I recomme nd a grant in Baldasar, which will permit the 
Court to answer the fundamental question rai s ed here regarding 
the scope of the right to counsel plus the question of subs e que~t 
use of counselless convictions, and a hold for this case. (This 
is assuming that a response in Baldasar and this case will not 
demonstrate some independent reason for denying.) The Court 
was understandably concerned in Argersinger with the impact of 
the decision, and any wider decision, on the criminal justice 
system. But the courts have lived with Argersinger now for a 
sufficiently long time, and sufficient attention has been 
focused on the problem of impact, e.g., S. Krantz, supra, that 
-u-
the Court can, with some surety, reenter the area to resolve 
the conflicts that have arisen. 
There is no response. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell #/-~,1 ~ ~
Re: scott ·v~ · Illinois, No. 77-1177 ~.J-z:........,'~· 
~'4SG-~ 
Scott was arrested and c~=_:~=.:~ft. The 
charge carried a possible punishm~nt ~<afin~ to $1 SO or 
imprisonment up to one year, or both. Petr was indigent at the - ~-
time of his trial, and was not advised of a right to the 
assistance of counsel: he did not request the appointment of 
counsel. After a bench trial at which Scott was not 
represented by counsel, he was convicted and fined $50. 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 
It refused Scott's invitation to extend Argersinqer ·v~ ·Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25 (1972), to cases in which the defendant might be 
but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
The petr begins with the observation that the Sixth 
Amendment applies the right to counsel "in all criminal 
prosecutions." He points out that the Sixth Amendment riqht to 
counsel has been regarded as an essential element of 
fundamental fairness, and has been incorporated into the due 
process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that 
the States are bound to provide counsel to indigent defendants --------~~ _.,_ ______________ _
in all criminal prosecutions, or at least in every criminal 
prosecution where the law authorizes imprisonment. 
Either of the rules contended for by petr entails an k/-,,-_ 
~
expansion of the right to counsel beyond the imprisonment-in- . 0 
.::,.,,tjt.~ 
fact standard adopted by the Court in Arger~inge~. Petr ~~-4......,, 
contends that while the Court correctly decided there that the 
Sixth Amendment requires at · least that counsel be provided in a 
trial resulting in imprisonment, it would be error to conclude 
that imprisonment-in-fac~ marks the limit of the Sixth 
Amendment requirement. Many cases which do not result in 
imprisonment nonetheless result in serious penalties for the 
convicted defendant. And other Sixth Amendment rights, enjoyed 
by a defendant not eligible for counsel under the imprisonment-
in-fact standard, cannot be exercised effectively without 
assistance of counsel. Further, the imprisonment-in-fact 
standard results in judicial creation of a class of "ultra-
petty offenses" in which judqes determine before trial that 
regardless of the penalties authorized by the legislature, no 
sentences of imprisonment will be imposed. 
The petr also argues that due process of law, 
considered apart from the particular lanquage of the Sixth 
Amendment, requires appointment of counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions, or at least in those in which imprisonment is 
authorized by law. Scott contends that without the assistance 
of counsel, many defendants will be unable to make skilled 
inquiry into the facts or to cope with questions of law that 
may arise. 
In anticipation of the arqument that society cannot 
afford to provide counsel to indigent defendants in all 
misdemeanor cases, or in all those with an authorized sentence 
of imprisonment, petr argues in effect that society cannot 
afford not to provide counsel in such cases. He bases this 
contention partly on the observation that "government has a 
paramount interest in assurinq that criminal trials result in 
fair determinations of guilt or innocence," and that assistance 
of counsel is often necessary to accurate fact-finding. He 
also urges that maintenance of the imprisonment-in-fact 
standard, requiring a pre-trial judicial determination of 
whether or not a sentence of imprisonment will be imposed upon 
conviction, detracts from society's interest in a fair and 
accurate criminal justice system. 
With regard to the cost of providing the legal 
services for which he contends, petr cites two recent studies. -------·---------
He reports that both studies "concluded that reliable 
statistics to support an accurate estimate of this cost do not 
exist, that 'the question of calculating the cost of defense 
services remains largely an enigma.'" Br., at 38. 
The petr also makes an equal protection argument in 
support of his position. Any rule that limits the right to 
counsel of indigent defendants in petty crimes, petr points 
out, depends on a classification on the basis of wealth. Since 
the right to counsel is of fundamental importance to a fair 
trial, petr concludes, a rule denying counsel to indigents 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
In closing, petr points out several respects in which 
he contends that his trial was unfair. These are set forth at 
pp. 62-64 of Petr's Brief, and I will not repeat them here. 
The resp relies heavily on Arqersinqer, which it views 
as a decision balancing the interest of the defendan~ in 
representation by counsel against the burden on the State if it 
is required to provide counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 
"Faced with the alternatives of allowing an accused to be 
deprived of his liberty without counsel or requiring the States 
? 
to provide counsel for all indigents accused of any criminal 
offense, the Court imposed a standard accommodating both the 
rights of the accused and the needs of society." Throughout 
its Brief, the State stresses that although the scope of other 
Sixth Amendment rights (other than the right to trial by jury) 
have never been made to depend upon the seriousness of the 
------------------------------------------
offense charged, none of the other such rights implicate a ,__ ____ _ 
"compelling pecuniary interest" of the State. 
The State argues that the distinction between the 
sanction of imprisonment and all other direct or collateral 
consequences of conviction is sufficiently clear and 
significant to provide a reasonable boundary for the right to 
counsel. In support of this contention, resp cites Muniz · v~ 
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 457 (1975), where the Court held that 
the imposition of a $10,000 fine did not require a jury trial. 
The Court said, "From the standpoint of determining the 
seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible 
deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are 
intrinsically different." 
The State also argues that indigent misdemeanor 
defendants would receive only small benefit from representation 
by counsel. The State argues that procedures in the 
misdemeanor courts are informal, that few defendants hire 
lawyers, and that often the state is represented not by an 
attorney but by the arresting police officer. It argues that 
'· 
the right to a jury trial almost always is waived, as it was in 
this case, so that there is no need for counsel to direct the 
defense in the more complicated setting of a jury trial. 
The small benefits to the defendants to be realized 
from expansion of the right to counsel, the State urges, cannot 
justify the high cost to the State of providing counsel. It 
cites the results of a survey that show tht since Argersinger, 
many local courts have stopped incarcerating misdemeanor 
defendants because of an inability to provide them with 
counsel. 
With regard to the pre-trial determination of probable 
sentencing required by the Argersinger rule, the State contends ----
that an experienced misdemeanor judge has no difficulty in 
making that judgment. It also argues that the defendant has no 
reason to complain of a pre-trial decision that forecloses the 
possibility of a sentence of imprisonment. If the State 
decides to tolerate this kind of sentencing decison rather than 
pay for counsel for all indigent misdemeanor defendants, then, 
according to the State, that decision is of no concern to 
either the defendant or this Court. 
The State contends that petr's claims based on the 
Equal Protection Clause and on the Due Process Clause 
considered apart from the Sixth Amendment were not raised in 
the state courts or in the petition for certiorari. Question 2 
'in the Petition for Certiorari raised the question whether 
7 
petr's trial was so unfair as to constitute a violation of due 
process. This claim was not passed on by either of the state 
appellate courts. 
Petr asserts that the other claims he raises in his 
Brief are comprised fairly within Question 1 of the Petition. 
"Whether the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States 
Constitution quarantee the right to 
counsel when a defendant is charqed 
with an offense punishable under state 
law by imprisonment, regardless of 
whether the defendant is in fact 
imprisoned?" 
The equal protection claim does rest on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that claim is not 
mentioned in either of the state court opinions in this case or 
in the Petition for Certiorari. The same is true of petr's 
argument that even if the Sixth Amendment does not require 
counsel for all indigent misdemeanor defendants, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does. My reading of 
the opinions below and the petition in this Court indicates to 
me that this case has been treated throughout as presenting the 
Sixth Amendment question left open in Arqe~singer, and I think 
it should continue to be treated on that narrow basis. 
Discussion: 
You set out your views in this area in your concurrin~ 
opinion in Arqersinger, a copy of which is attached to this 
'memorandum. 
Assuming that the Court will not now reexamine the 
~rqersinger holding and adopt your suggested due process 
approach to the provision of counsel in all petty or 
misdemeanor cases, I expect that it will tend towards some 
bright-line boundary for the right to counsel in such cases. 
(7) 
One possibility is to adopt the imprisonment-in-fact standard 
of Argersinger as the limit of the due process right to 
is to adop ~ standard of possibility-of-
a third is to settle o ~ rule requiring 
~ l counsel. Another 
~ imprisonment, and 
~fA -·~; sel for all misdemeanor defendants. 
~:~ There is little practical difference between the 
~ econd and third suggestions, since most petty or misdemeanor 
-----~ crimes carry the possibility of some imprisonment. This 
~~ probably explains why the petr is never careful in his Brief to 
ty 
'--
~v specify which of the two rules he prefers. (The "Question 
Presented" in the Petition for Certiorari does opt for the 
possibility-of-imprisonment standard; seep. 7 supra.) The -
difficulty with either of petr's suggestions is obvious -- the 
States must shoulder considerable additional burdens in order 
to enforce their laws, when in many cases the demands of fair 
and accurate fact-finding and application of the law may be 
satisfied without providing counsel. The difficulties with 
the first alternative, adopting the Argersinger rule as the 
limit of due process requirements, are stated in your 
concurring opinion in that case. 
] 
/~' 
roost. The The Argersinger chickens have come home to 
majority opinion in that case refers to the Sixth Amendment 
standards for "all criminal prosecutions" in defining the 
requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. If 
the language of the Sixth Amendment, and its history, compel 
the conclusion that counsel is required at least in "all 
criminal prosecutions" resulting in imprisonment, it is 
difficult to see any reasoned distinction that will limit the 
requirement at the point of imprisonment. Only the right to 
jury trial has been limited in a similar way, and that 
limitation rests explicitly on the peculiar history of the jury 
trial right. 
As a matter of practical statemanship, however, it 
would still be preferable to apply the due process rule of 
fairness that you suggested in Arg~rsiq~~r to misdemeanor or 
petty crime prosecutions not resulting in imprisonment. 
~~~"-'K...t)~ 
think it would be worth swallowing the logical difficulty of 
distinguishing imprisonment from other consequences of such 
prosecutions in order to avoid further extension of 
mandatory provision of counsel. 
In my view, the most difficult result to justify would 
be a holding that imprisonment-in-fact defines the limit of the 
due process right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. For all 
of the reasons stated in your concurring opinion in 
Argersinger, it seems clear that there will be at least some 
misdemeanor cases in which no imprisonment results, but in 
which the interests at stake and the complexity of the issues 
create a need for assistance of counsel. 
77-1177 SCOTT v. ILLINOIS Argued 12/4/78 




~ ~~ ~ ~) ~ 
~ ~ ~ if ./1) ~-....,,...---,,.' 




·~~ - ~~ 
~ - ~-f . ~ h(.) . ~ 
~ ~  ~ ( ~, 
~~~)~~  
.~ ...... c:;...,or;;~~L- IA.,.(__~"°~~. 
~~-- - .e..f'. ~ ~ J ~½ ~ 
~~~- /~~.~a4_~ 
~  'o/' c:;_ ~4 ~~~~ 
~ p ,~~~ ~ ( a-.,,J 14.Gr tJ-j J:} 
LfD fu tf37a~~~~L'.iS ~ 
~~~- \ 
5~~~----~~~~ 
t!J-1 P--L-~. ~ ~ ~ 
s~~~a;.J;f#~ 
~~~'-<-~J~ 
~~ ~ ~ -~ 
h, ~ ~~~- (9~ 
- ---~ct-- ( ~f:) 
~ ~ ~~~A...-vu,td--"k>~ 
~~ ~~~ iJ . ~ 11 
~~t>f~~94J~J 
s~~~~~~~ 





77-1177 Scott v. Illinois Con£. 12/6/78 




-.Ad.-. __ · __ 
~ b - • ,.!_ · ~ ~ I ~ - . 7 ~
~~-· ' > - ~ ~ . . . - -r- J...J?~1~ ·, ~' /A.A._ 
~-.-v ~ ~~· , , -- .• 
a,~ ,~~~~ . 
Mr. Justic~ Brennan ~ 
~ ~~~ ~ 
~ ~ ~ Le__ ~ ~ 







Mr. Justice -S te~ens ~ ---- -----·-
·' 




Mr. Justice Marshall ~...,,, 
Mr. Justice Black.mun ~ 
~----=:;~~~ -~ 
~ ~ ~ 41-- I 91-~  
- -e-~1-~ ~ '--t./ ~ ~._:_ 9~ 
~b£;._:;f ~ ,6~ ~ .Lo 
.I 
~ ~. ~ · ~~d---- J 
~Id-~ - ~~ ~ · -~ 
~ ·C.---~ ~ ~-' Trz:%.--L.-v"Vt.-L..--'(._ 
To: The Chief 'tJ'(!s~~ /J 
Mr. Jueti~ r,n~ri 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Juetioe Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: 1 2 JAN 1979 
Recirculated: -------1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi ~ 
No. 77-1177 {:_ M 
Aubrey Scott, Petitioner, lo W. C . . h S . / / / 'f n nt of ert10ra.n to t e u- / · 
v. preme Court of Illinois. /;, ~ 
State of Illinois. ~~..e-,__ 
[January -, 1979] ~~ 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIS'l' delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict 
among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper 
application of our decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25 ( 1972) .1 Petitioner Scott was convicted of theft and fined 
$50 after a bench trial in the Circuit Court ofc5ook County, 
Ill. His conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate 
appellate court and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
over Scott's contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution required that Illinois 
provide trial counsel to him at its expense. 
Petitioner Scott was convicted of shoplifting merchandise 
valued at less than $150. The applicable Illinois statute sets 
the maximum peualty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one 
~-:--:----=-7--~-;:--~ --.,.-:-:-....-------:-;--:---;- -
year in jail, or ooth. 2 e petitioner argues that a line of - --
' Compare, e. g .. Potts v. Estelle, 529 F. 2d 450 (CA5 1976); In re 
Di Bella, 518 .F . 2d 955 (CA2 1975); State ex rel, Winnie v. Harris , 75 
Wis. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (1977), with United States v. White. 529 
F. 2d 1390 (CA8 1976) ; Sweeten ,·. Sneddon, 463 F. 2d 713 (CAIO 1972): 
Ro//111~ v. Stat/', 299 So. 2d 5X6 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, -H9 U.S. 1000 
(1974) . 
i Ill . Ht•v . 8tat. 1969, ch. :38, par. 16-1. The penalty provh,ion of the 
~tatutr provides in relevant part: 
''A prrson first convicted of theft of property not from the pen;on and 




SCOTT v. ILLINOIS 
th is Court's cases culminating in Argermnger v. Hamlin, supra, 
11equirc Statl' provisio11 of counsel whenever imprisonment-is 
an authorized penalty. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this contention, 
quoting the followi11g language· from Argersinger: 
"We hold , therefore, that absent a kno~iug and intelli-
gent waiver. no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
fr]ony. unless he was represented by counsel at ·his 
trial. " 407 F . S., at 37. 
" Under the rule we announce today, every judge will 
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no ~---- ::,_,_.. impriso11rnrnt may he imposed, even though local law 
permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. 
He will hav<' a measure of the seriousness and gravity of 
the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer 
to represent the accused before the trial startsl Id., at 40. / 
The Supreme Court of Tllinois went on to state that it was 
" not inclined to rxteud Argersinger" to the. case where a 
defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which 
imprisomn('nt upon conviction is authorized but not actually 
imposed upon the defendant. 68 Ill. 2d 269, 272, 369 N. E. 
2d 881, 882 ( 1977). ·wP agree with the Supreme Court of 11 / _ /J IL J!./J 
Illinois that the Federal Constitution does not require a trial ~- 7. 
court to appo~~feudant such as 
pc~, and we therefore affinn its judgment. 
fo his petitiou for certiorari, petitioner referred to the issue 
in this casr as "the question left open in Argersinger v. Ham-
li11, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)." Petition, at 5. Whether this ques-
tion was inderd "left open" in A rgersinger depends upon 
in a pPnal inHtitulion olhrr tlrnu thr penif{'ntia.ry 110[ to rxrrrcl one rrar, 
or both. A p('J':-;on ronv1r·t<·d or ~,H'h theft a ~reo11d or suh~rquent fime, or 
arter a prior eo11vic-tio11 or an~· type of theft , ,;hall be impri~oncd i11 the· 
pmi!r11tian· from on<· lo /5 yc,1r~. . " 
71-1177-0PINION 
SCOTT 'V. ILLINOIS 3 
whether one considers that opinion to be a point in a moving 
line or a holding that the States are required to go only so far 
in furnishing counsel to indige11t defendants. The Supreme 
Court of Illinois, in quoting the above language from Arger-
singer, clearly viewed the latter as A...I.Jlersinger's holding. 
Additional support for this proposition may be derived from 
the cone] udill · aragraph of the opillion in that case: 
" The run of misdemeano·ts will not be affected by today's 
ruliug. But in those that en<l up in the actual <lepriva-
tio11 of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the ben-
efH of 'the guiding halld of counsel' so necessary where 
oue's Jibe11ty is in .ieopatdy." 407 U. S., at 40. 
Petitioner, on the other hand, refers to language in the 
Court's opinion, responding to the opinion of MR. Jus'l'ICE 
/ Pow8LL, which states that the Court "11ee<l not consider the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to 
counsel where loss of liberty is not involved . .. for here peti-
tioner was in fact sentenced to jail.'' Id., at 37. 
There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment 
its<'lf, as originally <ltafted by the Framers of the Bill of 
Rights, contemplatec-1 any guat'antee other than the right of 
an accused in a criminal prosecutiou to employ a lawyer to 
assist in his defense. \V. Beaney, "rhe Right to Counsel in 
Amencan Courts 27-30 (1955). ln PowelZ v. Alabama, 287 
U s. 45 (1932). the Court held that Alabama was obligated 
to appoint counsel for the Rcottsboro defendants. phrasing the 
inqmry as " whether the defendants were in substance deuiecl 
tlw right of counsel, and if so. whether such denial infringes 
the Due P,:gcess Clause of the Fourteenth Ame11dmeut." Id., 
at 52 It concluded its opinion with the following language: 
"The -C11ited 8tates by statute and every state in the 
Union by express provision of law, or by the <letermina-
Uon of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, 
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counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly 
to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the 
more serious crimes, and in a very limited number. to 
capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous 
accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inhere11t right 
to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the 
present, alld lends convincing support to the conclusion 
we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that 
l'ight." 287 U. S., at 73. --=-=---
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), held that not every 
indigent ctefenaant accused in a state criminal prosecution was 
entitled to appointment of counsel. A determina.tion had to ) 
be made in each i11Clividual case whether failure to appoint 
counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness. Betts was in 
turn overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
In Gideon, Betts was described as holding "that a refusal to 
appoint counsel for a.11 indigent defendant charged with a 
t:clm,ly did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment ... . " Id., at 339. 
Several Terms later the Court held in Duncan v. Louisiaria, 
391 U. S. 145 (1968), that the right to ~jury inal in federal 
court guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to 
the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court held, however, that "[i]t is doubtless true that there 
is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject 
to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not 
be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial require-
ment here applied to the States. Crimes carrying possible 
penalties up to six months do not require a "jury trial if they ----ot erwise qua 1 y as petty offenses . . . . Id., at 159 (foot-
note orn1 e ) . In Bal win v. N f!,W York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 
( HJ70), the co11trolling opinion of MR. JusTICE WHITE con-
cluded that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of 
the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than· 
::,ix months is authorize<l." 
'· 
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In Aryersinyer the State of Florida urged that a similar 
dichotomy be employed in the right-to-counsel area: any 
offense puuishable by less than six months iu jail should 11ot 
require appointment of counsel for an iudigent defendant.3 
The Aryersinyer Court rejected this analogy, however. observ-
ing that "the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy 
alld is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge aloue." 407 
U. S., at 29. 
The number of separate opinions in Gideon, supra, Duncan, 
supra, Baldw-i11, supra, anrl Aryersinyer, supra, suggests that 
I J ' ' constitutional line drawi11 becomes more difficult as the reach 
of the Constitution is extended furt er, and as efforts are 
made to t™IBJ)Ose 1-:n;-f~m one ~ea of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence to another, The process of \h-corporatio1~ 
creates special difficulties. for the state a11d federal contexts 
are often different and application of the same principle may 
have ramifications distinct in degree and kind. The range of 
humau conduct regulated by state criminal laws is much 
broader than that of the federal criminal laws, particularly 011 
the "petty" offense part of the spectrum. As a matter of 
coustitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to 
extrapolate 1~]1 alrea<t:'._ extended line' when, although the gen-
eral nature of the principle sought to be applied is clear. its 
precise limits and their ramifications become less so. We 
have now in our decided cases forsaken the literal rneanin of 
the Sixth Amendment. And we cannot a ack on the com-
m"on law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amend-
ment, since it perversely gave less ill the way of right to coun-
sel to accused felons than to those accused of misdemeanors. 
See Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 60. 
In Argersinyer the Court rejected arguments that social 
cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its hold-
rng, in some part because it thought these arguments were 
factually incorrect. 407 U. 8., at 37 n. 7. But they were 
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rejected in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion 
that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not 
be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent 
defendant hat! been offered appointed counsel to assist in his 
defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such 
a rule. The Court in its opinion repeatedly referred to trials 
"where an accused is deprived of his liberty," 407 U. S., at 32, 
and to "a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a 
brief period," 407 U. S .. at 33. THE CHIEF JUSTICE in his 
opimon concurring in the result also observed that "l!:Y 
de )nvation of libert is a serious matter." 407 U. S., at 41. 
Although the intentions of the rgersinger Court are not 
unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude toda hat 
Argersinger did indeed delimit the Six Amendment right 
to appomtea counsel in state criminal proceedings.1 Even 
weretlie matter res nova, we believe that the central premise 
of Aryersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty differ-
ent in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-
is emmeutly sound and warrants adoption of actual imprison-
ment as the liue defining the constitutional right to appoint-
ment of couusel. Argersinger has proved reasonably work-
able, whereas auy extens10n would create confusion a1rd 
1~ose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 
50 qmte diverse States." We therefore hold that the Sixth 
1 WP note that the hne drawn in Argersiuger wa;; with full awareness of 
th<' vanom; opt10ns. BoTh tlie petitioner in that case and the Legal Aid 
Society of New York, as arnicus curiae, argu<'d that the right to ap11oiutecl 
counsf'l sho11lcl JJertain in any case in which imJJri8onment was an author-
1zrd penalty for the underlying offf'llS<'. Brief for the Petitioner, at 4; 
Bnef of the Legal Aid Society of Nf'w York as Amicus Curiae, at 5-11. 
lfrspondent Florida and the arnici Statf's urged that the line be drawn as 
11 had been m Baldwin for purpose::; of the jury trial guarantee. See, e. y., 
Brwf of Hf'sponc!C'nt, at U. Tlw Solir1tor General argued for the :stand-
ard that was finally adopted-that of actual imprisonmf'nt. Brief for the 
United States a,; Amicus Curiae, at 22-24. 
5 UufortnnatC'ly, C'xte11s1ve empmral work ha:-; not ber,;n donf'. That 
wl11ch C'xist,; ;;ngg<'st,; that the rf'quirements of Argersinger have not provc<l 
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and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu;, 
t10n require only that any indigent criminal defendant who is 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment have been afforded the 
right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. The 
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Illi11ois is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
1o be unduly bmden~ome. Soe, e. y., Ingraham, The Impact of Arger·s 
;;UlfJer-One Year Later, 8 Law & Society Rev. 615 (1974). That somEj 
,p1n~d1ctionR have had difficulty implementing Argersiuyer is crrtainly not 
nn argumr11t for rxtendmg 1t . S. Krantz et al., Right to Coqrn;el jq 
(.'nn1inal C'a~r:s 1- JX (1!l7fi) , 
-
LFP/lab 1/15/79 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I am not able to join the opinion of the Court for 
the reasons stated fully in my concurring opinion in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, --- (1972). Petitioner 
here was convicted of shoplifting, and the only penalty 
imposed was a $50 fine. The applicable Illinois statute 
provided a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one year in 
jail, or both. Petitioner argues that counsel must be 
provided an indigent defendant whenever imprisonment is an 
authorized penalty. The Court rejects that argument, 
holding that Argersinger requires counsel only when there is 
an actual deprivation of a person's liberty. 
The Court's opinion, with commendable candor, 
recognizes that it is "line-drawing", that the line "already 
[is] extended", and that "our decided cases [have] forsaken 
the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment". Ante at 5. 
If the forsaking of the Sixth Amendment can be 
forgiven, I would have thought that recourse would have been 
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and its concept of fundamental fairness. To be 
sure, a drawn line - if bright enough - is thought to have 






reasons set forth in my opinion in Argersinqer, its "line" 
results neither in uniformity nor is it invariably easy to 
apply. Most misdemeanor or petty crime statutes provide, as 
does the Illinois statute at issue here, for a jail sentence 
or a fine or both, the sentence to vary according to the 
severity and circumstances of the offense, including the 
record of the offender. The penalty provisions of such 
statutes are intended to afford flexibility in sentencing, 
according discretion in this respect to the sentencing 
authority. 
The Argersinger line inevitably frustrates this 
salutory purpose in a high percentage of cases. It requires 
the presiding judge to determine in advance of hearing any 
evidence, or indeed in advance of knowing anything about the 
case or the defendant except the charge, to make one of the 
more critical decisions: whether he will forego the 
legislatively granted option to impose a jail sentence for 
even so much as a single day. Unless the presiding judge 
foregoes this option, he must appoint counsel if indigency 
is claimed - as it often is. The Court's opinion states, in 
the absence of "extensive empirical" documentation, that 
"Argersinger has proved reasonably workable". Ante at 
Perhaps this is true if the Court simply means that judges 
can follow the Argersinger rule. It is quite simple -






imposed on him by the legislature to consider whether the 
evidence adduced at trial and the record of the defendant 
warrants a jail sentence. Moreover, the decision not to 
exercise the prescribed sentencing discretion often is 
forced upon the judge by circumstances. In the busy 
metropolitan misdemeanor court, where dockets are 
overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, the 
appointment of counsel is likely to exacerbate these 
problems. In counties and small towns, remote from 
metropolitan bars, counsel may be wholly unavailable. It is 
predictable in these situations that all too often the 
pressure to take the easy Arqersinqer course of deciding in 
advance the character of the punishment, will be too great 
to resist. 
Quite apart from this de facto nullification of 
a large element of the sentencing discretion authorized by 
the legislature, the effect on the criminal justice system 
is unlikely to be in the public interest. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that the deterrence factor of the 
criminal law is weakened. There will be fewer jail 
sentences imposed for petty crimes, and the imposition of a 
fine upon an indigent is likely to be no penalty at all. 
The other side of the coin, addressed in my 
Argersinger concurring opinion, is that no counsel need be 
provided for petty offenses where conviction may be more 
', 
4. 
serious than a brief incarceration. The case that comes at 
once to mind is the revocation of one's driver's license 
where driving may be indispensable to livelihood. There may 
be many other situations where conviction of an offense, not 
carrying a jail sentence, is more l deprivation than a night 
in jail. 
In sum, the Argersinger line-drawing often will 
lack the element of fairness when applied to defendants; and 
in other situations seems likely to disserve the oublic 
interest in the detering of petty crime. In a more 
fundamental sense, it is grounded in no constitutional 
provision. The Court concedes that the Sixth Amendment's 
literal meaning has been "foresaken". In my view, the very 
concept of fundamental fairness as a due process doctrine 
4-tf?-...-D 
applicable to each trial is foresaken by inflexible line-
-'\ 
drawing. In my Argersinger concurrence, supra, at , I 
outlined the principles that should guide a Court's decision 
in determining whether and when duep process requires the 
appointment of counsel. I adhere to the views there 
expressed. 
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llr. Justice Brennan 
)Jr. Justice Stewart 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.8 
No. 77-1177 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
Aubrey Rcott, Petitioner, I 
v. preme Court of Jllinois. 
Rtat(' of Illinois. 
rFebruary - , rn7D] 
Mn. Jn,TJCE Powr:LL, concurring in the judgment. 
The petitioner was tried for shopliftiug under ai1 lllinois 
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a. $500 fine or one 
year iu jail. or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial, 
the petitiouer was convicted and fined $50. The Court rejects 
the petitioner's argument that as all indigent. he should 
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was 
an authorized prnalty for the crime with which he was 
charged. Relying 011 Argersi11ger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 
(1972). the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Ame11dments require the States to provide counsel only to 
i11digents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Al-
though 1 concur in the affirmancr of the petitio11er's convic-
tion. T am U11able to join the opinion of the Court. Reo 
id., at 44 ( PowELL. J.. concurring). 
The Court's opinion. with commendable candor. states that 
"our decided cases [have] forsaken the literal mea.ning of the 
Sixth Amendment.' ' Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is 
highlighted by the absence of historical or precedential justi-
fication for the line the Court draws to limit the "already ex-
tendrd " reach of the Sixth Ameudrnent. Ibid. As the Sixth 
A11w11dme11t provides no guidance in this area. the Court 
should l'<'CUr to tlw Du<' Process Clause. which in its basic con- · 
ccpt of fairness gives full recog11ition to the constitutional 
interests of criminal defendants. Instead, the Court finds in 




SCOTT v. ILLINOIS 
ge11t state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to 
imprisonment alld those who are not, and concludes that the 
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to 
assistance of appointed counsel. 
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Arger-
singer is easy to apply, in the sense that a sta.te court can have 
to doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence 
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in 
Argersiuger, however, 1 adhere to my view that the Court's 
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that 
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the 
rule. 
Some defenda11ts may be affected more seriously by the 
payment of a fiue, the loss of a driver's license, or the impact 
of the stigma attached to a conviction, than by a, brief incar-
ceration. Yet no matter how serious the nonirnprisonment 
consequences of conviction, there is 110 right to counsel under 
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is im-
posed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to 
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual 
questions as complex as those raised by the charges against 
defendants who are sentenced to prison. The lack of counsel 
may be especially unfair where a defendaut who is not af-
forded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial 
by jury, for "before a jury the guiding haud of counsel is 
needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole con-
sistent with the best case 011 behalf of the defendant." Id., at 
40 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of coun-
sel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty 
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. The 
penalty provisions of such statutes are intended to afford the 
judge considerable flexibility in fitting the sentence to the 
eir-cumsta11ces and sevf)rity of the offense and to the record of 
. ' 
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the offender. The "bright line" adopted by the Court in this 
case and Aryersinger inevitably frustrates this important pur-
pose. The trial judge, in advance of hearing any evidence, 
indeed, in advance of knowing anything about the case except 
the charge, must decide whether he will forego the legisla-
tively granted authority to impose a senteHce of imprisonment 
upon conviction. Unless the judge surrenders this option, he 
must appoint comisel to assist the indigent defendant. Thus, 
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an importa.nt 
prelirninary sentencing decision without the knowledge on 
which such decisions should be based. 
Moreover, given the practical realities of the rnisdemeauor 
and petty off ensr trial courts in the States, 011e can forsee 
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort 
the penaltiPs imposed. In busy metropolitall courts, where 
dockets are overcrowded and delay a.lready is intolerable, trial 
judges are likely to dispeuse with the option of imprisonment 
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an 
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towus. re-
mote from metropolitan bars and often strapped for funds, 
counsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial 
means of the local government. As a result, iu many cases 
i11 which due process would not require assistauce of counsel, 
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the· 
option of a senteuce of imprisonment.* 
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions intro-· 
duced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the 
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public 
interest. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the deter-
rent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is 
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail 
sentences irnposed. The Court's rule will also make the en-
-;eSfP ~ational L<:'gal Aid and Defender A,-"n ., ThP Othf'r FRC'f' of 
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forcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if 
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contem- ' 
plates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of un-
counseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
In sum, the Argersinger line often will result in unfairness 
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to 
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system 
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the 
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule. 
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doc-
trine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible line-
drawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide 
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after con-
sidering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of 
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors 
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersiriger, I re-
1 
viewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on 
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (PowEt.L, J., concurring). 
Here, the petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge 
of shoplifting several items valued at $13.68. The prose-
cutor made no opening or closing statement, did not object 
to any testimony offered by the petitioner, declined the 
court's invitation to cross-examine the petitioner, and called 
no rebuttal witnesses. The trial court, in contrast, took an 
active role in questioning the petitioner about the facts sur-
rounding his arrest. Since there was no unfairness in trying 
the petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel, 
I join in the judgment affirming his conviction. 
; 
I 
To: The C'lle.f Justice 
Mr. Justice S+Pwart 
Mr. Justice White 
M ... Ju.,t•ce U1.rsli.1.ll 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Hr. Juc;tico PJ rell 
H.::-. :, ... .,tice R l"."'lquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Circ-ulated: 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
Aubrey Scott, Petitioner, l . . 
v. preme Court of Illinois. 
State of Illinois. 
[February -, 1979] 
Mn. JusTICl!J BRENNAN, dissenting. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
assistance of Counsel for his defense." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 tr. S. 335 (1963), extended the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment and held that the right includes the 
right of the indigent to have counsel provided. Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that the right recognized in 
Gideon extends to the trial of any offense for which a con-
victed defendant is likely to be incarcerated. 
This case presents the question whether the right to counsel 
extends to a person accused of an offense that, although 
punishable by incarceration, is actually punished only by a 
fine. Petitioner Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in 
violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 16-1 (A)(l) (1972), an 
offense punishable by imprisonment up to one year or by a 
fine up to $500, or by both. About four months before 
Argersinger was decided, Scott had a bench trial, without 
counsel, and without uotice of entitlement to retain coun-
sel or, if in<ligent,1 to have counsel provided. He was found 
guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a $50 fine. 
1 Scott wm, found to ix, indigent at the time of his initial appeal, and an 
uttorncy was therefore appointed for !um and he was provided a free 
tran~c:npl of his trial for use on the appeal. The Illin01s eourt:,; and the 
p11rti<·~ hnve a:,;,,mned lm; indigeney at thP timP of trinl for purposes of this 
case Rec AppP11dix to Pet. for Cert.., at la-2a, lOa-1 la. 
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The Court, in an opinion that at best ignores the basic 
principles of prior decisions, affirms Scott's conviction without 
counsel because he was sentenced only to pay a fine. In my 
view, the plai11 wording of the Sixth Amendment and the 
Court's precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's uncoun-
seled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend .. 
ments and should be reversed. 
I 
Both the Court's opinion and the concurrence intimate a 
view that the Court's precedents ordaining the right to ap .. 
pointed counsel for indigent accuseds in state criminal pro .. 
ceedings fail to provide a principled basis for deciding this 
case. That is demonstrably not so. The principles developed 
in the relevant precedents are clear and sound. The Court 
simply chooses to ignore them. 
Gideon v. Wainwright held that, because representation by 
counsel in a criminal proceeding is "a fundamental right, 
essential to a fair trial. '' 372 U. S., at 342, the Sixth Ame11d ... 
ment right to counsel was applicable to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment : 
"[R] easou and reflectioll require us to recognize that in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. 
This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, 
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of 
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused 
of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed 
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly 
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged 
with crime. few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers 
they can get to prepare and present their defenses. · That 
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants 
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the 
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in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right 
of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, 
but it is in ours. From. the very beginning. our state 
an<l national constitutions and laws have laid great em-
phasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed 
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every <lefenclant stauds equal before the law. This noble 
ideal cannot be realized if the poor mau charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist 
him." Id., at 344. 
Earlier precedents had recoguized that the assistance of 
appointed counsel was critical. not only to equalize the sides 
in an a<lversary criminal process,2 but also to give sub-
stance to other constitut10nal and procedural protections 
afforded criminal defendants.3 Gideon established the right 
2 " !Tim Sixth AmPndmrntl rmhodir;, a rcalistir rc<"ognition of the 
obvion,; imth that the averagf:' defrudant does not havr the professional 
lrgal Hkill to protect him:;elf whrn brought, brforr a tribunal with power 
to take his lifr or libcrt~,, wherein thr prosecution is l rr ]prrsPnted by 
expnieneed and IParned roun,-el. That. whirh i~ ~implr, orderly and 
neces~a~· to the lawyer, to thr nntrninrd la~·1n.m mar appear intricate, 
complex and mysteriou1, ." Joh11so11 v. Zerb~t, 304 U. S. -!58, -!62--16:~ 
(19:38) . 
8 "The right to 1X' heard would be, in many case , of little avail if it did 
not comprPhPnd tlw right. to be !ward b~· counsel. Even thr intPlligent 
and Pducat<'d layman ha:,: small and sometimr~ no ;;kill in the science of 
law. If charged with crime, hr i:,; ineapalilr., generall.,·. of determining for 
himHelf whrtl1rr the indictmPnt i:,; good or bnd. He is unfamiliar with the 
mle,; of rvidrnrr. LPft without the aid of <·ounsrl hr ma~· be put on trial 
w1t.hont. a propn rharge, and convirtr<l upon incomf)('tent rvidrneP, or 
cviden<"<' irrrlevant 10 the is:;ue or othrrwt:-«' inadmissible. He la~b both 
thl-' ~kill and knowlrdge adPquatrl~· to pr<'pare hi~ drfern;e, ewn though 
he haYf' a Jl<'rfpct one. Hr rN.Jmrrs tlw guiding hand of coun~PI Ht every 
step m thr proePedmgs again~t him. Without it, though hr be not guilty, 
he faer:; the dang<'r of conv1ction lWl':\U~<' lw do<',.; not know how to 
establish !mi innorrncc. If thnt hr trnc ol 111<·11 of mtelligence, how much 
4 
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to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds as a categorical 
requirement, making the Court's former case-by-case clue-
process analysis, cf. Betts ,,. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 ( 1942), 
unnecessary in cases covered by its holding. Gideon involved 
a felony prosecution, but that fact was not crucial to the deci-
sion; its reasoning extended. in the words of the Sixth Amend-
ment. to "all criminal prosecutions." 1 
Argersinger v. Hamlin took a cautious approach toward 
implementing the logical consequences of Gideon's rationale. 
The petitioner in Argersinger had bee11 sentenced to jail for 
90 days after conviction-at a trial without cousel-of carry-
ing a concealed weapon, a Florida offense carrying an author-
ized penalty of imprisonment up to six months and a fine up· 
to $1.000. The State, relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U. S. 145 (1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 
(1970), urged that the Sixth Amendment right to couusel, like 
the right to fury trial. should not apply to accuseds charged' 
with "petty" offenses punishable by less than six months 
imprisonment. But Argersinr1er refused to extend the "petty" 
offensp limitatio11 to thP right to counsel. The Court pointed 
out tha.t the limitation was contrary to the express words of 
the Sixth Amendment. which gvarantee its enumerated rights 
"li]n all criminal prosecutions"; that the right to jury trial 
was the only Sixth Amendment right applicable to the States 
that had bee11 held inapplicable to "petty offenses"; " that this 
more trne is it of the ignorant am! illiterate, or tho~e of feeble intellect."· 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 4.'i, o8-6H (1932). 
4 Ser Aryer8inger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, ;31 (1H72). 
r. "It, is ~imp[~, uot arguable, nor ha::l any court ever held, that the trial 
of a petty offense may bP held in secrPt, or without notice to thr accused 
of t.he charges, or that m ~uch case~ tlw defpndant has no right to 
confront his accusrr,; or to comprl the attendance of w1tne,;~es in hi::l own 
of'half." Aryerswyer v. Harn/in. 407 l'. S. :25, :28 (1972), quotmg ,Jun hr, 
The lhght to CounKf'l m Mi:;uf'mrauor Case~, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 705 
(Hl68) . Cf. In re Oliver, 3;33 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial); 
Pointer v Texas, 380 r:. S 400 (1965) (right to coufi;ont_ation) ,; 
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limitation had been based on historical considerations pecu-
liar to the right to jury trial; 0 and that the right to counsel 
was more fundamentally related to the fairness of criminal 
prosecutions than the right to jury trial and was in fact essen-
tial to the meaningful exercise of other Sixth Amendment 
protections. 1 
Although its analysis, like that in Gideon and other earlier· 
cases, suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
should apply to all state criminal prosecutions, Argersinger 
held only that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed 
counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by six months of 
inca.rceration or less, if he is likely to be sentenced to incar-
ceration for any time if convicted. The question of the right 
to counsel in cases in which incarceration was authorized but 
woulcI not be imposed was expressly reserved.8 
Wmihington v. Texas, 388 11 . S. 14 (1967) (right to compubory procC'ss of 
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (right to a 
speedy trial); Groppi v. Wisconsin. 400 U. S. 505 (1971) (right to an 
impartial jury): Henderson v. Moroan. 426 ll . S. ti37 (1976) (right to be 
mformed of the nature and causC' of the accmmtion). 
0 " While there is historical i:;11pport for limiting the 'deE'p commitment'" 
to trial by jury to 'r;erious criminal <'a1<es,'· there is no imch support for a· 
similar limitation on the right to a::;::;ista.nce of counsel ... 
"The Sixth Amendment ... extended the right to counsel beyond its· 
'Common-law dimensions. But there b nothing in the language of the-
Amendment, its history, or in the decisions of thi:; Court, to indicate that 
it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in pett.v offenses 
wherein the common law previous!)· did require that counsel be provided."' 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 30 (footnote and citations omitted). 
7 Id. , at 31; see text and note, at n. 3, supra. 
~ "MH. JusnCJ,J POWELL ~ugge8tS that tlwse problems f requiring the· 
pre,-,enro of ro11nsel to msure tlw arrused' a. fair trial] are rai~ed even in-
s1t 11ation1< whrrP thl're is no pro~pr<'t of imprisonment. . . . We need not, 
romnder tlw rr4uirrments of the Sixth Amrndineut as regard:; the r:ght to· 
co11 nsel where lo~s of lilwrt~· b 1101 involved, howr,·er, for· lien• petitionei:· 
wa:-1 m fa<:t sentenC('(:I to J.a1I. '' 407 [T , S., at W7.: 
', 
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II 
In my view petitioner could prevail in this case without.e.x-
tending the right to counsel beyond what was assuu;ied to 
exist in Argersinger. Neither party in that case questioned 
the existence of the right to counsel in trials involving "non-
petty" offenses punishable by more than six months i11 jail.0 
The question the Court addressed was whether the right 
applied to some "petty" offenses to which the right to jury 
trial did not extend. The Court's reasoning in applying the 
right to counsel in the case before it-that the right to counsel 
is more fundamental to a fair proceeding than the right to 
jury trial and that the historical limita,tions on the jury-trial 
right are irrelevant to the right to cou11sel-certainly cannot 
support a standard for the right to counsel that is more restric-
tive than the standard for granting a right to jury trial. As 
my Brother POWELL commented in his concurring opi11io11 in 
Argersinger, 407 U. S .. at 45-46. "It is clear that wherever the 
right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that 
an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases -in 
which there is a due process right to a jury trial." Argersinger 
thus established a. "two dimensional" test for the right to-
counsel: the right attaches to any "non-petty" offense punish-
able by more than six months in jail and in addition to any 
offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless of the 
maximum authorized pe11alty. See Duke, The Right to, 
Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am. Crim. I;,. 
Rev. 601 (1975) . 
The offense of "theft" with which Scott was charged is cer-
tainly not a "petty" one. If is puriishable by a sentence of 
up to one year in jail. Unlike many traffic or other "regula-
tory" offenses, it carries the moral stigma associated with com-
mon-law crimes traditionally recognized as indicative of moral 
9 See, e. g., Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U. S., at 27, 330-331, 36, and: 
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depravity.10 The State indicated at ora.1 argument that the 
services of a professional prosecutor were considered essential 
to the prosecution of this offense. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 39; cf. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, 407 U. S., at 49 (PowELL, J., 
concurring). Likewise, nonindigent defendants charged with 
this offense would be well advised to hire the "best lawyers 
they can get." 11 Scott's right to the assistance of appointed 
counsel is thus plainly mandated by the logic of the Court's 
prior cases, including Argersinger itself .12 
10 Because a theft conviction implie:s dishonesty, it may be a basis for· 
impeaching petitioner's te:stimony in a court proceeding. People v. 
Stufliebean. 24 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068--1169, 322 N. E. 2d 488, 491-492' 
(1974) . Becauoe jurors must, be of "fair character" and "approved 
integrity," Ill. Hcv. Stat. ch. 78 § 2 (1977), petitioner may be excluded 
from jury duty as a result of his theft conviction. Twelve occupa.tions 
licensed under Illinois Jaw and 23 occupation:; licensed uuder city of 
Chicago ordinances require the Hcense app!icant to have "good mora:I 
character" or some equivalent, background qualification that could be 
found lll1&'tti8fied b<'cause of a theft convict.ion. See Chicago Council of 
Lawyers, Study of Licensing Restrictions on Ex-Offenders in the City of 
Chicago and the State of Illinois 8, A-17 (1975). Under federal law 
petitioner's theft. conviction would bar him from working in any capacity 
in a bank in:sured by the F. D. I. C., 12 U. S. C. § 1829, or po:s:sibly in any 
public or private employment requiring a security clearance. 32 CFR 
§ 155.5 (h) and (i), and§ 156.7 (b) (1) (iii) (1977) . 
11 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963); see .Junker, The 
Right to Counsel in Misdemeallor Ca~e::;, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 713-714 
(1968) . 
u My Brother PowELL's concurrence in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 44, 
joined by my Brother REHNQU1::;T, also ::;upports petitioner',; right to 
appointed counsel in this ca.se. The concurrence explicitly stated that the 
right to counsel should extend at least as far as the right. to jury trial, 
id .. at 45-46, and its preference for a case-by-ca~e approach was repea.tedly 
limited to "petty" offense::;. See, e. g .. id. , at. 45, and n. 2, 47, 63. Even 
in petty offenses, the Argersinger concurrence would have mandated the· 
following procedures : 
"The determination [whether coun,;el mu:;t be appointed] should be made· 
hefore the accused for.roally vleads ; many petty cases are resolved hy· 
8 
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III 
But rather than decide consonant with the assumption in 
regard to nonpetty offenses that was both implicit and explicit 
in Argersinger, the Court today retreats to the indefensible 
position that the Argersinger "actua:.l imprisonment" stalldard 
is the only test for determining the boundary of the Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel in state misdemeanor 
cases, thus necessarily deciding that in many cases (such as 
this one) a defendant will have 110 right to appointed counsel 
even when he has a constitutional right to a jury trial. This 
is simply an intolerable result. Not only is the "actual im-
prisonment" standard unprecedented as the exclusive test, but 
the problems inherent in its application demonstrate the 
superiority of an "authorized imprisonment" standard that 
would require the appointment of counsel for indigents 
accused of any offense for which imprisonment for any time 
· is authorized. 
First, the authorized imprisonment standard more faith-
fully implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment iden-· 
tified in Gideon. The procedural rules estab[ished by state· 
statutes are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for 
an offense, not to the actual penalty imposed in particular 
cases. The authorized penalty is also a better · predictor of 
the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach to 
guilty p'eas in which the assistance of cotmsrl may be required. If the· 
trial court should conclude that the assistance of counsel is not required 
in any case, it should state its rea~ons so t.hat the issue could be preserved 
:for review." Id., at 63. 
My Brother POWELL neverthele,;-; concurs in this case withont c-onfront-
ing the apparent inconsistenciP:s with his po~ition in Argersinger. His 
concurrence is based in part on an ex po~t- facto review of what occurred 
at frial : 
"The prosecutor made no opening or closing statement, did not ob,iect tn 
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conviction of an offense.13 With the exception of Argersinger, 
authorized penalties have been used consistently by this Court 
as the true measures of the seriousness of offenses. See, e. g., 
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 68-70 ( 1970); Frank v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); United States v. More-
land, 258 U.S. 433 ( 1922). Imprisonment is a sanction particu-
larly associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses pun-
ishable by imprisonment accordingly possess the characteris-
tics found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel. 
By contrast, the actual imprisonment standard, as the Court's 
opinion in this case demonstrates, denies the right to counsel 
in criminal prosecutions to accuseds who suffer the severe con-
sequences of prosecution other than imprisonment. 
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses. The trial 
court, in contrast, took an aci ive role in questioning the petitioner about 
the facts surrounding hb arrest ." Ante, at 4. 
My Brother PowELL neglects to mention that without petit,ioner's own 
testimony the prosecution had not proved he did not pay for the item he 
allegedly stole, or that the judge'» questions were apparently motivated by 
the prosecutbr'8 refusal to develop the facts on his own adequately to 
satisfy the judge's reawnable doubts. See Appendix, at 9. The problems 
posed by such post-hoc analyses of the fairnrss of proceedings and of how 
proceedings might have been different if courn,el had been appointed 
demonstra.te the wisdom of the Court 's po8ition, most recently 11eaflirmed 
in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 487-491 (1978), that prejudice is 
conclusively presumed when the right. to m;sistanee of counsel is denied: 
"The right to have the assi:-<ta.nce of counsel is too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculatjons as t.o the amount of 
prejudice arising from its denial." Id., at 488 ( quoting Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
13, 43 (STEWAH'r, J., concurring) . 
1 8 See n. 10, supra. The ,;cope of colla.teral consequences that would be 
corn,titutionally permis,,ible under the actual imprisonment standard re-
main:'l tmsettlerl, and this uncertainty is another i,;ourcc of confusion 
generated by this standard . SPP, e. y .. Tr. of Orn] Arg., at 35-37; United 
States v. White, 529 F . 2d 1390 (CA8 1976) ; Note, Argersinger v. Hamlin 
and the Collateral Use of Prior Mi:;demeanor Convictions of Indigents 
Umepresented by Counsel at. Tnal, 35 Ohio St. L. J1• 168 (1D74) . 
,· : .. · 
'· 
.: .. ,. 
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Second, the "authorized imprisonment" test presents no 
problems of administra.tion. It avoids the necessity for time-
consuming consideration of the likely seute11ce iu each individ-
ual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurak 
predictio11s, unequal treatment. aud apparent and actual bias. 
These problems with the actual imprisomnent standard wf'rl' 
suggested in my Brother PowELL's concurrence in A rger-
singer, 407 U. S .. at 52-55. which was echoed in scholarly 
criticism of that decision.'' Petitioner emphasizes these de-
fects, arguing with considerable force that implementation of 
the actual imprisonment stamlard must assuredly lead to 
violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner. at 47-59. 
Finally. the "authorized imprisonment" test ensures that 
courts will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the 
appropriate range of peualties to be considered for each 
offense. Under the actual imprisonmeut standard, 
"[t]he judge will ... be forced to decide in advance of 
trial-and without hearing the evidence-whether he will 
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sen-
tence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to 
consider the full range of punishments established by the 
legislature. His alternatives, assuming the availability 
of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the 
discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this 
discretion in advance and proceed without counsel.'~ 
14 See, e. g., S. Krantz el al., Right to Counsel in Criminal Case,: The 
Mandato of Argen,inger v. Hamlin 69-117 (1!)76): Duke, Thr Ri1d1t to 
Appointed Counsel: Argcrsinger and He~·ond, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rrv. 601 
(1975) . 
Th ~ case-by-case approach advocatrd by my Brother PowELL in 
Argersinger has al,;o been criticized as unworkable because of the adminis-
trntivr burden it would impose. Ser, e. g., National ConfNenrr of 
Commiss1onen; on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rulrs of Criminal Pro-
~edurr, Rule 321 (b), Comnwnt, p . 69. 
' I 
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Argersinger v. H arnlin, 407 U. S., at 53 (POWELL, J., 
concurring). 
The authorized imprisomnent standard. on the other hand, 
respects the allocation of functions between legislatures and 
eourts i11 the admi11istration of the criminal justice system. 
The apparent reason for the Court's adoption of the 
"actual imprisonment" standard for all misdemeauors is con-
cern for the economic burden that an "authorized imprison-
ment" standard might place 011 the States. But. with all 
respect. that concern is both irrelevaut and speculative. 
This Court's role in euforcing constitutional guarantees for 
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budget-
ary decisions of state governments. A unanimous Court made 
that clear in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 196-197 
( 1971), in rejecting a proposed fiscal justification for providing 
free transcripts for appeals only when the appellant was sub-
ject to imprisonment: 
"This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin [v. 
lll-inois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956)] . . . . Griffin does not 
represent a balance betwee11 the needs of the accused and 
the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition 
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an 
appeal as would be available to others able to pay their· 
own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that 
exists when criminal procedures are made available only 
to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in 
the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal 
interest is, therefore, irrelevant." Li~J 
In any event, the extent of the alleged burden on the States 
is. as the Court admits, ante, at 6-7, 11. 5, speculative. Al-
though more persons are charged with misdemeanors punish-
able by incarceration than are charged with felonies. a smaller 
percentage of persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as; 
i ::i see ali-o Bound~ v . $1mith, 430 U . S. 817., 84-"5 (.1977.)_ 
12 
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indigent, and misdemeanor cases as a rule require far less 
attorney time.10 
Furthermore, public defender systems have proved econom-
ica1ly feasible, and the establishment of such systems to replace 
1:1,ppointmeut of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable 
Jevels even when the number of cases requiring appointment 
of counsel increases drarnatically. 11 ' The public defender sys-
tem alternative also answers the argument that an authorized 
imprisonment standard would clog the courts with inexperi-
enced appointed counsel. 
Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent's alarmist 
prophecies that an authorized imprisonment standard would 
wreak havoc 011 the States is that the standard has not pro-
cluced that result in the substantial number of States that 
already provide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is 
authorized-States that include a 113-rge majority of the counft 
try's population and a great diversity of urban and rural 
10 See National ConferenC"e of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
Uniform Rule:; of Criminal. Procednre, Rule · 321 (b) Comment, p. 70 
(1974) (ei:<timate;; that only 10% of misdemeanor defendant,~, a;; opposed 
to 60-65% of felony defendant:;, meet the neces"'a.ry indigency standard); 
National LPgal Aid & Defender As::1'u, The Other Face of Ju::,tice, Note I, 
pp. 82-Sa (197:3) (survey indi cat~::; national avPragfl i::; 65% indigency in 
f Plony cases and only 47% in misdemeanor cases) . 
The National AdviHory Commi::;:,;ion on Criminal Ju::;tice Stnnda,rcls and 
Goals adopted a. maximum ca;;eload standard of 150 felony cases or 400 
misdemeanor cases per attorne~· per year. National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standard;; & Goals; Conrts, Standard 1:3.12, pp . 276-
277 (1973). Sf'e al~o The Other Face of Jui:itice, S'upra, Table 109, at p. 73, 
17 A ::;tudy conducted in the State of Wiscon;;iu, which introduced a 
State PubliC' DefenclPr System after the Wiscon~in Supreme Court in 
State e.r rd. Winnie v. Harris. 75 Wi R. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (H/77,). 
extPndecl th<> right to coumel in the war urged by 1wtitioner in this case,. 
1ndicRted t lmt. the average cost of providing cmmtiel in a rniHdPmcanor ca&' 
was reduced from $150-200 to $90 b~, ll ti ing ,L puhlie defender rather than 
appointing private coun;-;el. Brief for A mic'us (}uriae N,Itioual Leg;;tif 
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environments.18 Moreover, of those States that do not yet 
provide counsel in all cases where any irnprisomneut is author .. 
ized, many provide counsel when periods of irnprisoumeut 
18 Sce, e. g., ALASKA: Alaska C"onst. .. Art. l § 11; Alaska Stat. 
§ 18.85.100 (a) (1974) (an~· offPn8c' p11nishahlP b~· inenrreration; or which 
ma,y rrs11lt in loss of va!uab!e licrn,.:o or hrav~· finp); Alexander v. City of 
Anchorage. 490 P. 2d !HO (1971); AHIZONA: Ariz. Huie Crim. Proe .. 
R11le 6.1 (b) (Supp. 1978) (nnr criminal procc>Pdings which may rPH11lt in 
punishnwnt b~· Jos.~ of liberty; or whpre thr eo11rt. coneh1des that the 
interest, of justict• so requires): CALIFOR~IA: Cal. Penal Code § 987 
(West Supp. 1978) (all rrimillal casrs); CONNECTICUT: !-l Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 51-296 (a), 51-:297 (f) (Supp. 197H) (all criminal actions); 
DELA WARE: Del. Code Ann ., tit. 29, § 4602 (l!:!74) (all indigC'nts undel." 
arrest, or eharged with crime if defPndan1 re4uc-'8ts or court orders); 
HAWAII: Haw. Hev. Sta.t., tit. 37, § 802-1 (Hl7fi) (an~· offeusr punish-
able hy confinement in jail); J:NDIANA: Ind. Con,.;!.., Art. I, § 13 (all 
criminal prosc•cntions); Bolkovac v. 8tatP of lncliana, 229 Ind. 294, 98 
N. E. 2d 250 (1951) ; KENTUCKY: 17 Ky. Rule Crim. Proe., Rule 8.04 
(1978) (offrnsr:.; puni,.;hablc b~· ;L finC' of more than $500 orb~· imprison-
ment) ; LOUISIANA: La . Stal. Ann., Code Crim. Proc., Art ,. 518 (Supp. 
1978) (offrni;es punishable b~· irnprismm1ent); :VIASSACHUSETTS: Mass. 
Supr. ,lucl. Ct . Grn . Rule :uo (anr crime for which Sf'ntC'nec of imprison-
ment may be imposed); ~IINNESOTA: :\fiun. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.02, 
611.14 (SuJJJl . 1979) (felonie.,; nncl '·gro"" misdm1eanons"; "tatute defines· 
" petty" misdPmeanors as tho,<P not punishable by imprisonnlPnt or fine 
over $100) ; NEW HA:V1PSHIRE : N. H. Rev. Stat,. Ann. §§ 604-A:2·, 
625:9 (1974) (offPnse.,; punishablr by imprisonment.); NEW MEXICO: 
N. Mex. Stat.. Ann.§ 41- 22A-12 (Supp. 1975) (offeni;e carr~·ing a possible' 
scntenec of imprisonment.) ; NEW YORK: C. P . L. § 170.10 (1971) (all 
misdemranon; cxct'pt, traffic violation,.;); People v. Weinstock, 80 Misc. 
2d 510, Fill, 36:~ N . Y. S. 2d 878 (1974) (traffic violations subject to 
possible imprisonment); OKLAHO::.VIA: Okl,L. Stat. Ann. 22-464. 1271 
(1969) (all criminal cases) ; Stewart v . State, 495 P. 2d 834 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1972) ; OREGON : Brown v. M ultnornah County Dist. Ct., 29 Ore. 
App. 917, 56G P . 2d 522 (1977) (all crimina.l case.,;) ; SOUTH DAKOTA: 
S. D . Comp. UlWI'\ Ann . § 2:3-2-1 (Supp. 1978) (any criminal action) ; 
TENNESSEE: TPlln. Code Ann . §§ 40-2002, 40-20Da (1975) (persons 
accu~ed of any crtmf' or misdemeanor what,-oever) ; Tl<-:XAS: TPX. Code 
Crim. ProC' . Art . 26.04 (Hlfi5) (an~· fplon~· or mi~demPanor 1n111iAhable b)·· 
-impri,;onmcnt); VIRGINIA: Va . Code Ann ., §§ 19.2- 157, 19 .2-160 (.SuvJ?-
14 
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longer than 30 days.10 3 months,20 or 6 months 21 are author-
ized. In fact. Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel 
under the curreut laws of at least 33 States.22 
1978) (miRdPmPanors thr penalty for which may bP confinemrnt. in jail); 
WASHINGTON: Wm;h . .J. Crim. Rule 2.11 (a) (1) (1978) (all criminal 
offenses punishable by loss of libPrty): WEST VIRGINIA: W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 62-3-lH (Supp. 1977) (per:,ous under indictment for a crime): 
WISCONSIN: Wis. Const., Art. 1, § 7, State ex rel. Wiunie Han·is. 75 
Wis. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (1977) (nil criminal prosecutions). 
Respondent claim:,; that thr <"tatutes and case la,w in ,;omp of thesr cases 
" nPed not Le rPad as requiring appoiutmrnt of counsel for all imprison-
able ca::;es ." RespondPnt 's Brief, at :3;3 n. 28. Although the law is not 
unambiguous in every ca,;e, ambiguit ie::; in the laws of other Sta.tr,; suggest 
that thfl list, is verhaps too ,;hort, or nt l*•ast that other States provide 
counsel in all but, the most trivial offensrs. E. g., COLORADO: Colo. 
Rev. Stal ,. Ann. § 21-1-103 (Hl74) (all mii::demeanors and all municipal 
code violations at the discretion of the public defender); GEORGIA: Ga. 
Code Ann ., § 27-320:3 (1078) (any viulntion of a state la.w or local 
ordinance which may result in inc:u·crration); MISSOURI: Attorney 
General Opinion No. 207, Young 6-21-G3 (counsel should be appointed in 
misdemeanor cases of "more than minor significancp" and "where prejudice 
might result"); ~IONTANA: :\font. Rrv. Code Ann. § 95-1001 (1969) 
( court may assign counsel in misdemPauors " in the intrrest, of justice") ; 
NEVADA: NPv. Rev. Stat. § 171.397 (1973) (persons aecm,ed of "gross 
misdcmP1rnors" or felonies); NEW ,JEHSEY: N . .J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 158 
(A) (197:3) ; N. J. Crim. Rules 3:27-1 (1973) (any offensp which Is 
indictable) ; PENNSYLVANIA: Pa. Huie Crim. Proc. 316 (a.)-(C') (Supp. 
1978) (in all but "summary cas<>s"); WYOMING: W,vo. ShL. Ann. 
§§ 7-1-110 (a) (Pntitled to appointed co1msPl in ''seriuu~ rrimes"), 7-1-
108 (v) (srrious crimes are those for whirh inrarcprntion is n "practical 
possibility"), 7-9-105 (all case,; where accused shall or may be punished 
by imprisonment. in penitentinry) (1977). 
In addition, Alabama, Florida, Grorgia, and Mi:,;sissippi wrrP until today 
covpred by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the "authorized imprisonment" 
standard. See Potts v. Estelle, 529 F. 2d 450 (CA5 1976); Thomas v. 
Savage, 513 F. 2d 536 (CA5 1075) . 
Several 8tates that havp, not adoptPCl the authorized imprisonment 
standard give courts discretionary authority to nppoint cmmsel in eases 
where it is pPrccived to be nrcessary (e. g .. Maryland, Missouri, Montana., 
Torth Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania). 
[Footnotes W, 20, 21, and 22. are on 1). 16] 
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It may well be that adoption of an authorized imprisonment 
sta11dard will lead states and local governments to re-exam· 
ine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local gov-
ernment may determine that it uo longer desires to authorize 
i u IOWA : Iowa Code Ann ., § 8Ia.2, n .nle '2 § 3 ; § 813.3, Rule 42 § 3 
(1978 Spec. Pamphlet) . 
20 MARYLAND : Md . Ann . Code, Art. 27 A, § 2 (h), 164 (1976) ; 
MISSISSIPPI : Mis;;. Code Ann. § 99- 15-15 ( 1972) . 
21IDAHO : Idaho Code Ann. tit. Hl, § 851 (1978); Mahler\', Birnbaum, 
95 Idaho 14, 501 P. 2d 282 (l\:l72) : ~IAINE: Newell v . State, 277 A. 2d 
731 (Maine, 1971) ; OHIO : Ohio Huie Crim. C . P ., Huie 2, Rule 
44 (A) (B) (1975) ; RHODE ISLAND: Supr. Huie Crim. Proc. 44; Rule 
Crim. Proc. 44 (1976) ; State v. Halliday, 280 A. 2d 33:3 (S11pr. Ct. 1971) ; 
UTAH : Utah Code Am1., § 77- 64-2 (Suw. 1977) ; Salt Lake City Corp . 
v. Salt foke Cou.nty , 520 P . 2d 2112 (Snpl' . Ct . 1974) . 
22 See nn . 1&-22, supra. The actual frgure may be clo:;er to 40 State;;. 
The following Sta tes appear to b<' governed only by the ' 'likelihood of 
imprisonment" :standard: ARKANSAS: Ark. Huie Crim . Proc., Huie 8.2 (b) 
(1977) (all criminal offenses ,except in misdemeanor cases where court 
determines that, under no circumstance's will conviction re:sult in imJ)rison-
ment ) ; FLORIDA: Fla . Huie Crim. Proc. 3.111 (b) (1975) (any mis-
demeanor or municipal ordinance violation unles:; prior writ.ten ,::ta.tement 
by judge that conviction will uot ret,illlt in impri:,;onment); NORTH 
CAROLINA: N. C. Gen. Stat., § 7A-451 (a) (Supp. 1977) (any cai;e in 
which imprisonment or a fine of $500 or more i,; likely t-0 be adjudged); 
NORTH DAKOTA : N . D . Cent. Code, Rule Crim . Pror., Huie 44 (1974) 
(all nonfelony cases unle:ss magi:;trate determine;, that, sentence upon 
convictio11 will not include impri:,;onment); VEHMONT : Ver. Stat. Ann., 
§ 13-5201-5231 (Supp. 1977) (any misdemeanor puni:shab!e by any period 
of impri:;onment or fine over $1,000 unle~$ prior determinatio11 that im-
prisonment or fine over $1,000 will not be imposed). Two State:; l'equire 
appointmmt of counsel for indigents in case:s where i1 , is "<'onstitutionally 
required" : ALABAMA : Ala. Code, tit. 15, §§ 15-12-1, 15-12-20 (1975) ; 
SOUTH CAHOLINA : S. C. Code § 17-3-10 (1977) . Some, States require 
counsel in misdemeanor case,; only by virtue of judicial deci:sions reacting 
to Argersinger: KANSAS: State v. Giddings. 2Hi Kan. 14, 21-22, 531 P. 
2d 445 (1975) ; MICHIGAN: People v. Studebaker, 387 Mich. 698, 199 
N. W . 2d 177 (1972) ; People v. Harri!;, 45 :\lich. App. 217, 206 N. W. 2d 
478, 480 (1973); ~EBRASKA : Kovarik v . County of Bar/1ler, 224 N . W. 
2d 761 (Neb . 1975) . 
16 
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incarceration for certain minor offe11scs in light of thf' ex1wnse 
of meeting the requireme11ts of the Constitution. lu my view 
this re-examination is loug overclue. 2 " In ally Pvent, the 
Court's actual imprisonrnPnt standard must inevitably lead 
the courts to make this re-examiuation, which plainly should 
more properly be a legislative responsibility. 
IV 
The Court's opinion turns the reasoning of Argersinger on 
its head. It restricts the right to counsel, perhaps the most 
fundamental Sixth Amendment rightt1 more narrowly tha.ll 
the admittedly less fuudamental right to jury trial. 2" The 
abstract pretext that "constitutional line drawing becomes 
more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is exteuded fur-
ther, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area 
of Sixth Amendment jurisprudeuce to another," ante, at 5, 
cannot camouflage the anomalous result the Court reaches. 
The Court's opinion reminds one of Mr. Justice Black's 
description of Betts v. Brady: "an anachronism when handed 
down" that "ma[kes] an abrupt break with its own well-
considered precedents." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 
345, 344. 
2" See e. g., S. Krantz et al., s·upra, n. 14, at 445-606. 
24 "In an advers:1ry system of criminal justic<:>, thi:-rr i:s no right more 
essential than the righ1. to the a:ssistanc<:> of counse!." Lakeside v. Oregon, 
.,rn5 U.S. 333,341 (1978). 
25 "[T]ho i11terest protected by thC' right to have guilt or innocenc<:> 
determined by a jury-temperinµ; the poE:s:bly arbitrary and harsh <:>xercisc 
of prosecutorial and judicial power-while important, i:s not, 11,; funda-
mental to the guarantee of 11 fair trial as iH tho right to <·ot111::1:>l." 
Arger·singer v. Hamlin. 407 U. S., at 4fi (Powt:i,L, ,T., concurring) (foot-. 
Dote~ omitted) . 
2 . 
the petr in the present case, for he had a right to a 
jury trial. See Brennan's opinion, at 6-7 & n. 12. 
We have talked about this before. The sentence 
quoted by Justice Brennan is followed immediately by a 
discussion that clearly indicates that the relationship 
between the rights to counsel and jury trial is based on 
the need for the assistance of counsel before the jury. 
"An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a 
nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together 
unassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent 
whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the 
defendant. If there is no accompanying right to coumel, 
the right to a jury trial becomes meaningless." Id., 
at 46. Where the defendant makes a valid waiver of 
his right to a jury trial, the need for assistance of 
counsel before a jury obviously cannot require or 
justify appointment of counsel. 
We have already met Justice Brennan's criticism 
on this point to a significant extent. We mention the 
waiver of jury trial at pp. 1 and 4, and quote from 
your explanation of the need for counsel in jury trials 
at p. 2. I propose that we add the footnote indicated at 
p. 2 ) C 'J°I a/-f-1cfeef 
3. 
Justice Brennan's second criticism rests on the 
procedures you recommended for trial courts in your 
Argersinger opinion. There you indicated that in 
administering the due process standard of fairness, the 
trial judges should inquire, before the defendant enters 
his plea, into the need for counsel, and should place on 
the record the reasons supporting a conclusion that 
counsel is not required. Id., at 63. See Justice 
Brennan's opinion, at 7 n. 12. Since the trial judge 
did not conduct such an inquiry on the record in the 
present case, Justice Brennan seems to think that you 
are committed to concluding that the defendant was 
denied due process . I am sure that he draws support 
for his conclusion on this point from the final sentence 
of your Argersinger opinion: '~s the proceedings in the 
courts below were not in accordance with the views 
expressed above, I concur in the result of the decision 
in this case.". Id. , at 66 
I have always taken the view that the final sentence 
of your Argersinger opinion referred to the failure of 
the trial proceedings to conform with the requirements of 
them 
due process as you had expounded/In the opinion. Thus, 
you indicated that should counsel not be appointed for 
4. 
an indigent, "[t]he trial court would then become obligated 
to scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the 
protection of the defendant. If an unrepresented defendant 
sought to enter a plea of guilty, the Court shald examine 
the case against him to insure that there is admissible evi-
dence tending to support the elements of the offense. If 
a case went to trial without defense counsel, the court 
should intervene, when necessary, to insure that the 
defendant adequately brings out the facts in his favor and 
to prevent legal issues from being overlooked. Formal 
trial rules should not be applied strictly against 
unrepresented defendants. Finally, appellate courts 
should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to appoint 
counsel and the proceedings which follow." Id., at 63-64. 
It is true that here, the trial court did not --pursue on the record an inquiry into the need for 
assistance of counsel. Although that failure does 
make review of the fairness of the trial more difficult, 
I do not think that anything in your Argersinger opinion 
indicates that this failure is itself a due process 
violation. I suggest we add the sentence indicated at 
p. 4 of the concurring opinion to make clear the focus 
of appellate review under the Due Process Clause. 
to~· 'fbe Ch-1e1' J(ist1vc 
· Jtr. Juetioe ,~ 
Mr. Jua'iioe,, Sti:,\ial't 
Kr. Juettoe White 
tfr. Just1oe Yarshe.1.1 
Mr. Justice Bla.olallun 
)(r. Ju.stice Reh'nquiet 
11r. Justioe Stevens 
From: ar. Justioe PoweU 
Clroul&'l;eda------
12 FEB 1979 
'2nd ?>'RA.ff 
Reo1roulateda _____ _ 
'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT&S 
No. 77-1177 
Aubrey Scott, Petitioner, 
On Writ of Certiorari to, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois. 
v. 
State of Illinois. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE ·PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
The petitioner was tried · for shoplifting under an Illinois 
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one 
year in jail, or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial, 
the petitioner was convicted and fined $50. · ·The Court rejects 
the petitioner's argument that as an indigent, he should 
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was 
an authorized penalty for the crime with which he was 
charged. Relying on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 
( 1972), the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require the States to provide counsel only to 
indigents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Al-
though I concur in the affirn1ance of the petitioner's convic-
tion, I am unable to join· the opinion of the Court. See 
·id., at 44 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
The Court's opinion, with cotnmendable candor, states that 
"our decided cases ·[haveJ departed from the literal meaning of I 
the Sixth Arne11dment," Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is 
highlighted by the absence of historical or prececle11tial justi-
fication for the line the Court draws to limit the "already ex-
tended" reach of the Sixth Amendment. -Ibid. As the Sixth 
Amendment provides no guidance in this area, the Court 
should recur to the Due ;Process Clause, which in its basic con· 
cept of fairness gives full recog11ition to the constitutional 
interests of crimirial defendants. -Instead, the Court finds in 
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gent state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to 
imprisonment and those who are not, and concludes that the 
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to 
assistance of appointed counsel. 
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Arger-
singer is easy to apply, in the sense that a state court can have 
to doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence 
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in 
Argers-inger, however, I adhere to my view that the Court's 
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that 
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the 
rule" 
Some defendants may be affected more seriously by the 
payment of a fine. the loss of a driver's license. or the impact 
of the stigma attached to a conviction. than by a brief incar-
cerat10n. Yet no ma.tter how serious the nonimprisonment 
consequences of conviction. there is no right to counsel under 
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is im-
posed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to 
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual 
questions as complex as those raised by the charges against 
defendants who are sentenced to prisou. T'he lack of counsel 
may be es1wcially unfair where a defendant who is not af-
forded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial 
by Jury, for "before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is-
needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole con-
sistent with the best case on behalf of the defendant." Id., at 
46 ( PowELL, J .. concurring) .1 j 
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of coun-
sel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty 
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. The 
1 When , on tlw othl'r hand, fht' d<,l'rndant waiw,; hi,- right to a jur.v 
trial, th1,.; particular r<'a"on for affordmg him thr a,.;~j"t.wcr o[ HJ):l,>0i11tedl 
<tfo1m"r·l i, nof pN1 Illf'Jtt ... 
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penalty provisions of such statutes are intended to afford the 
judge considerable flexibility in fitting the sentence to the 
circumstances and severity of the offense and to the record of 
the offender. The "bright line" adopted by the Court in this 
cii,se and Argersinger inevitably frustrates this important pur-
pose. The trial judge, in advance of hearing any evidence, 
indeed, in advance of knowing anything about the case except 
the charge, must decide whether he will forego the legisla-
tively granted authority to impose a sentence of imprisonment 
upon conviction. Unless the judge surrenders this option, he 
must appoint counsel to assist the indigent defendant. Thus, 
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an important 
preliminary sentencing decision without the knowledge on 
which such decisions should be based. 
Moreover, given the practical realities of the misdemeanor 
and petty offense trial courts in the States, one can forsee 
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort 
the penalties imposed. In busy metropolitan courts, where 
dockets are overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, trial 
judges are likely to dispense with the option of imprisonment 
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an 
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towns, re-
mote from metropolitan bars and of ten strapped for funds, 
counsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial 
means of the local government. As a result, in many cases 
in which due process would not require assistance of counsel, 
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the 
option of a sentence of imprisonment.2 
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions intro-
duced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the 
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public 
interest. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the deter-
" See National Leii:al Aid and Defender A,-;sn ., Tlw Other Face of 
,Justice 38-40, 63-64 (1973) ; Argersinger, supra, at 55-61 (PowELL, J., 
concurring). 
~ . . 
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rent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is 
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail 
sentences imposed. The Court's rule will also make the en-
forcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if 
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contem-
plates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of un-
counseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55 
(POWELL, J., concurring) . 
In sum, the Argersinger line often will result in unfairness 
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to 
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system 
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the 
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule. 
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doc-
trine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible line-
drawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide 
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after con-
sidering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of 
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors 
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersinger, I re-
viewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on 
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Whether or not the trial court pursued this inquiry on the \ 
record, the appellate courts reviewing the conviction of an 
uncounseled indigent must determine whether the failure to 
provide counsel denied the defendant a fair trial. Here, the 
petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge of shoplifting 
several items valued at $13.68. The prosecutor made no 
opening or closing statement, did not object to any testimony 
offered by the petitioner, declined the court's invitation to 
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses. 
The trial court, in contrast. took au active role in questioning 
the petit1011er about the facts surrounding his arrest. In sum,\ 
it does not appear that there was any unfairness in trying the 
petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel. 
Accordingly, I .ioin iii the judgment affirming his conviction. ) 
ib:pumt Qio-mi qf tlt't ~ttltt~ ;§hdtg 
1f¥Jtinghttt. ~. ~. 20.;r~.;t 
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SUPREME COUBT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 77-1177 
Aubrey Srott, Petitio,wr, I 
On Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
s fv. . pl'cme Court of lllinojs, tatc o llli1101s. 
[February -, 1979] 
Mn. JrsTTCJ·: RLACKMUN, rlissrnting. 
For substa11tially tlw rrasons sta.tf'cl hy iVIH. Jt·wr1c1D BHEN-
NAN in Parts I and IT df his dissenting opinion. I would hold 
that thl' right to counsel sr('ured hy the Sixth a11d Fourteenth 
Amendm<'nts <'Xtcnds at ·1east as far fl$ tlw right to jury trial 
secur0d by those amendmN1ts. Af'f'ordi11gly, I would hold 
that an indigC'nt ddC'ndant in ·a state criminal case must bP 
affonh•d appointf'd counsel wlH'IH'VPr t-lw dde11da11t is prose-
cuted for a nonpetty criminal offf'ns-e, that is. 01w punishable 
hy mor<' than six months' imprisonment. see Vuntan v. 
Louisiana, :391 r. 8. 145 (19GR); Bnldim:n v. New York, 399 
U. ~- oo ( Hl70). or whenever tlH' rlefrndant is convicted of an 
offf'nSf' and is actually subjected to a krm of irnprisonrnc'11t, 
Arr;ers-iuyer V. Hrimlin, 407 r. R. 25 (1972). 
This resolution. I feel. would provide tht: "bright, line" that 
<lefot 1cla11 ts, prosecutors, and trial and appellate <'Ourts all 
rle8ervp and. at the sa1nc time. would reconcilf' 011 a princip!Pd 
basis the i111portant considerations that led to the rlPcisiom; in 
Duncan, BaldW'in, and Argersi11yer. 
On this approach. of course. the judgment of the Ruprcmr 
Court of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott's conviction should 
lJc• l'<'V<'rsed. since he was convictl'd of an offenst' for which 
he was constitutionally r•ntitl<'d to a, jury trial. r, th<'t·eforc: 
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. . preme Court of Illinois. 
ta.te o mo1s. 
,[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
The petitioner was tried for shoplifting under an Illinois 
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one 
year in jail, or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial, 
the petitioner was convicted and fined $50. The Court rejects 
the petitioner's argument that as an indigent, he should 
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was 
an authorized penalty for the crime with which he was 
charged. Relying on Argersinger v. H arnlin, 407 U. S. 25 
( 1972), the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require the States to provide counsel only to 
indigents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Al-
though I concur in the affirmance of the petitioner's convic-
tion , I am unable to join the opinion of the Court. See 
id., at 44 (POWELL, 'J., concurring). 
The Court's opinion, with commendable candor, states that 
"our decided cases ·[haveJ departed from the literal meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment." Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is 
highlighted by the absence of historical or precedential justi-
fication for the line the Court draws to limit the "already ex-
tended" reach of the Sixth Amendment. Ibid. As the Sixth 
Arnendme11t provides no guidance in this area, the Court 
should recur to the Due Process Clause, which in its basic con:-
cept of fairness gives full recognition to the constitutional 
interests of criminal defendants. Instead, the Court finds in 
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gent state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to 
imprisonment and those who are not, and concludes that the 
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to 
assistance of appointed counsel. 
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Arger-
singer is easy to apply, in the sense that a sta.te court can have 
no doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence I 
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in 
Argersinger, however, I adhere to my view that the Court's 
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that 
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the 
rule. 
Some defendants may be affected more seriously by the 
payment of a fine, the loss of a driver's license, or the impact 
of the stigma attached to a conviction, than by a brief incar-
ceration. Yet no rna.tter how serious the nonimprisonment 
consequences of conviction, there is no right to counsel under 
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is im-
posed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to 
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual 
questions as complex as those raised by the charges aga.inst 
defendants who are sentenced to prison. The lack of counsel 
may be especially unfair where a defendant who is not af-
forded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial 
by jury. for "before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is 
needed to marshar the evidence into a coherent whole con-
siste11 t with the best case on behalf of the defendant." Id., at 
46 (POWELL, L concurring) .1 
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of coun-
sel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of 
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty 
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. The-
1 When, on the other hand, the defendant waives his right to a jury 
trial, this particular rea:son for affording him the assistance of appointed 
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penalty provisions of such stattites are intended to affottd the 
judge considerable tlexibility in fitting the sentence to ·the 
circumstances and sever.ity of the offense and to the record of 
the offender. The "'bright line" adopted by the Court in this 
case and Argersinger inevitably frustrates this important -pur~ 
pose. The trial judge, in advance, of he~ring any evidence, 
indeed, in adva;1ce of knowing anything ,about the case except 
the charge, must decide whether he wilf 'forego the legisla-
tively granted authority to impose a senteric·e of imprisonment 
upon conviction:'- Unless the judge' surrenders this option, he 
must appoint counsel to assi~t the indigent defendant. · Thus, 
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an important 
preliminary sentencing decision without the knowledge -on 
which such decisions should be based. 
Moreover, given the practical realities of the misdemeanor 
and petty offense tria-1 courts in the States, one can forsee 
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort 
the penalties imposed. In busy metropolit~n courts, where 
dockets are overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, trial 
judges are likely to dispense with the option of imprisonment 
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an 
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towns, re-
mote from metropolita.n bars and ofte11 strapped for funds, 
coullsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial 
means of the local government. As a result, in many cases 
in which due process would not require assistance of counsel, 
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the 
option of a sentence of imprisonment.2 
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions intro-
duced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the 
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public 
·· interest. It is not unrea.sonab1e to suppose tha.t the deter-
2 See National Legal Aid and Defender Assn,, The Other Fa.ce of 





SCOTT v. ILLINOIS 
rent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is 
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail 
sentences imposed. The Court's rule will also make the en-
forcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if 
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contem-
plates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of un-
counseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
In sum, the Aryersinger line often will result in unfairness 
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to 
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system 
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the 
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule. 
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doc-
trine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible line-
drawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide 
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after con-
sidering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of 
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors 
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersinger, I re-
viewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on 
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
Whether or not the trial court pursued this inquiry on the 
record. the appella.te courts reviewing the conviction of an 
uncounseled indigent must determine whether the failure to 
provide counsel denied the defendant a fair trial. Here, the 
petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge of shoplifting 
several items valued at $13.68. T'he prosecutor made no 
opening or closing statement, did not object to any testimony 
offered by the petitioner, declined the court's invitation to 
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses. 
The trial court, in contrast, took an active role in questioning 
the petitioner about the facts surrounding his arrest. In sum, 
it does not appear that there was any unfairness in trying the 
petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel 
Accordingly, 1 Join in the judgment affirming his conviction. 
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Mn. Jus'rIGE POWELL, co11curring. 
For the reasons stated in my opinion iu Aryers'inyer v, 
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25. 44 (1972). 1 do not thi11 k the rule 
adopted by the Court in that case is required by the C'onsti~ 
tution. Moreover, the drawing of a linC' based on whethei' 
there is imprisonment (even for overnight) call have the 
practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other 
types of cases iii which conviction can have more serious 
consequences. The Aryersin(Jer rule also tends to impair the 
proper f unctionillg of the criminal justice system in that t rial 
judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before know-
ing anything about the case except the charge . all too often 
will be compelled to forego the legislatively granted option to 
impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. Pre-
serving this option by providing counsel of te11 will be in'.lpos-
sible or impracticable-particularly in congested urban courts 
wlwre scores of cases are heard in a single sitting. and in small 
and rura.l communities where lawyers may not be available. 
Despite my continuiHg reservations about the Argersinger 
rule. it was approved by the Court in the 1972 opinion and 
four Justices havP reaffirmed it today. It is important that 
this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts 
across tlw country that confront this problem daily. Accord-
ingly. a11d mimlful of stare decisis, l join the opinion of the 
Court. 1 do so, however, with the hope that iu due time a 
majority will recognize that a rnorP flexible rule is co11siste11 t 
with du(' process and will better serve the cause of justice. 
.-












JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
V 
.$5tt.p-rtut.t ~curl of tJrt ~ttitth ~f:aug 
'J]lr1udp1tgf:ctt. l9. <lf. 2.cJ.;r~, 
Re: No. 77-1177 - Scott v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
My short dissent in this case, I suspect, speaks for 
itself. 
/ 
I dislike to do this to you and to deprive you of a 11 court. 11 
You have, however, five votes for _the judgment. I found this 
case tantalizing. The solution I propose reconciles, I think, 
the respective conclusions that have been reached in the right 
to counsel and right to a jury trial cases. I must confess, of 
course , that neither side urged this rn.iddle ground. Each 
wanted his own way all the way. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
,· 
Fehruarv 22, 1Q79 
17-1177 Scott v. Illinois 
Dear Pott~r.: 
In view of our diqcussio~s, an~ those that took 
place at last Fridav's Conferenc~, I ~rn consid~rinq 
concurrinq in Bill Rehnquist's ooinion for the ourposP of 
making a Court. 
I woula accompany this with a brief concurrinq 
statement along the lines set forth in the enclosed draft. 
What ~o you think? 
Sincerelv, 
Mr. JusticP Stewart 
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